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The Auto Pact: Precedent or Isolated
Phenomenon?
John Rehm*
Let me concentrate this afternoon on the Auto Pact' and per-
haps rephrase the topic of this discussion in terms of the question:
Is the Auto Pact a precedent with some force and vitality for other
similar arrangements between the United States and Canada, or
should it be viewed rather as an isolated phenomenon? I appre-
ciate the opportunity to discuss this question, and I thank Sidney
Picker for raising it, because I was part of the American delega-
tion that negotiated this arrangement in Montebello, a lovely resort
in sub-zero weather. Also, I might add, there was a fiendish combi-
nation of ample food and liquid refreshment. I think some day I
will write a minor footnote to history on how skillfully the Canadian
government can use such things in a negotiation of this kind. To
add to that, the building in which we were located became over
heated (whether that was deliberate or not I'll never know), and
every now and then the Candians would say, "God it's hot in here,"
and they would throw open the windows totally. In sub-zero tem-
peratures the winds would blow in upon us, and then the American
delegation would be chilled to the bone, and we would close the
windows and return to the negotiations. As part of the delega-
tion I was also rather heavily involved in the process whereby
our own government obtained the necessary implementing legisla-
tion to put the Auto Pact into effect. 2 I must confess that since that
time I really have done very little thinking about this topic, but I
think the question as to whether it is precedent or an isolated phe-
nomenon is a good one for us to think about. The genesis of the
agreement was a very difficult situation that arose between the United
States and Canada and almost resulted in a very serious confronta-
tion. I think the United States would probably have been driven
to the imposition of countervailing duties on automotive products
from Canada, and I think in turn the chances were very good
that Canada would have engaged in some sort of retaliation. A
* Busby, Rivkin, Sherman, Levy & Rehm, Washington, D.C.
1 Agreement Concerning Automotive Products with the Government of Canada, Jan.
16, 1965, [1966) 1 U.S.T. 1372, T.I.A.S. No. 6093.
2 Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965, 19 U.S.C. § 2001 (1970).
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rather serious unravelling process in terms of our trade relations
might have begun. This pact was conceived as an attempt to over-
come that difficulty, which was obviously overcome. I recall very
vividly during the negotiations in Montebello the statement made
on at least one occasion by a senior Canadian minister, made very
openly to the two negotiating teams. I do not know how publi-
cized this statement was in Canada or the United States. In es-
sence I recall him saying that he saw this pact as the first in a
series of free trade arrangements. Unless my memory is totally
wrong, he thought there was a fair chance that by 1975, which
would have been a decade away at that time, the two nations would
agree to substantially free trade in all major industrial sectors. This
statement was made by a minister of considerable experience, and
I think it was a serious comment on his part. There certainly were
suggestions of moving into other sectors; I recall aircraft parts be-
ing mentioned, and some literature that I read coming up in the
plane suggested electrical appliances and even furniture might be
subjects of negotiation. So certainly at the time there was some
feeling, or some hope if you will, that perhaps the Auto Pact would
lead to other similar arrangements.
Looking back, I am struck by a number of problems that af-
fected the Auto Pact itself, even though it was enacted. Beyond
that I am struck by an evolution - I think I would be more prone
to say "devolution," if you will excuse the poor pun - in Ameri-
can trade policy that made similar arrangements of this sort con-
siderably less likely and probably unlikely.
As to the arrangement itself, the United States was obliged to
seek a GATT waiver because the United States was not enacting
the pact on an MFN basis, but rather on a purely discriminatory
basis in terms of products from Canada. I was not part of the
effort, made largely in Geneva, to obtain the waiver,' but I do know
that it was obtained with considerable difficulty and in spite of a
feeling of resentment on the part of other countries.4 I do not think
they really felt the waiver was fully justified. As I recall, the
United States tried to argue that the arrangement would have no
trade impact on the GATT countries because Canadian products
would not compete with other automotive products they exported to
America, obviously having in mind their smaller cars. Our expe-
rience since then tells us that this was a somewhat disingenuous
3 GATT: 14 BISD 37 (1965).
4 See GATT: 13 BISD 112, GATT: 14 BISD 181.
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argument. In any case the waiver was obtained, but not without
some ill feeling as a result. I think the resentment by some of the
GATT countries is an important element when considering a similar
arrangement between the United States and Canada.
In Congress, the Auto Pact came under increasing attack, par-
ticularly in the Senate. The Ways and Means Committee in the
House did not have much difficulty approving the necessary imple-
menting legislation. Obviously the big three American automobile
companies were for it, the administration was for it, and there was
very little, if indeed any, opposition. The fact of no opposition at
all, I think, alerted the Senate Finance Committee, and some of its
members, particularly Senator Gore, who suggested that possibly the
big three had discouraged certain elements of domestic industry,
which might have objected or at least raised questions about the
arrangement, from doing so.
I also think there was a feeling, of particular sensitivity to the
Senate Finance Committee that the arrangement was a kind of fait
accompli; that is, while constitutionally permissible under our system,
it was perhaps not too wise or desirable for the President to con-
clude through his agents an executive agreement and then return
and say to the Congress: "We have an arrangement with another
country. We think it affords benefits. We, of course, have entered
into it subject to Congressional action, but you know you really
should go along." I think that was a latent problem, particularly
for the Senate, which has taken quite seriously in recent years
(though it has not been able to do much about it) its function un-
der the Constitution of advising on, and consenting to treaties. The
inevitable tension between the President's use of executive agree-
ments, on the one hand, and on the other, the Senate's preference
for treaties to undertake international obligations, is a factor to be
considered in determining whether this type of arrangement will be
used in the future.
There was also the problem, which became more acute in terms
of the trade statistics that the United States developed, as to whether
the pact really was a genuine free-trade arrangement, given the
condition that only qualified manufacturers could exercise the right
of duty-free entry into Canada. The balance of trade began to
swing. I will note parenthetically, although I have never delved
into the specifics, that horrendous statistical problems arose between
the Canadian and American statisticians. Only recently have the
two sides finally agreed on a common method of determining the
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
balance of trade in the automotive sector, eight years after the con-
clusion of the agreement. Whether the figures were legitimately
calculated or legitimately used is beside the point. The fact is that
the Congress and particularly the Senate decided to make a great
deal of this dramatic swing, whereby the United States fell from a
net surplus position to a substantial net deficit position. It reached
a point in the 1970 Trade Bill (which did not go anywhere, thank
God, since it was a very bad bill indeed in my view) where the
Senate Finance Committee wrote into its version of the bill a provi-
sion that may have actually required the repeal of the implement-
ing legislation if a genuine free-trade arrangement were not
achieved. At the very least, it called upon the President to seri-
ously consider termination of the agreement, as he has the authority
to do, if a genuine free-trade arrangement were not achieved.
In terms of American trade policy in the late 1960's and the
early 1970's, it seems to me that there was a distinctly unpropitious
environment for considering a similar arrangement, even assuming
that there had been no substantial criticism of the Atuo Pact itself.
I suppose I would note two major developments in United States
trade policy since the Kennedy Round. (Let me confess openly
that I regard myself as a liberal Democrat who voted for McGov-
er. Therefore, if I say harsh things about the Nixon administra-
tion, you will know how to take them.) First, there was the tre-
mendous protectionist surge that arose in Congress immediately
after the conclusion of the Kennedy Round in the fall of 1967,
when many bills were introduced to increase tariffs and impose im-
port restrictions.
The lobby with which the delegation had to contend was pri-
marily the textile lobby, surely the most potent in those years and
I would guess it still is today. It almost became an annual ritual
whereby the Senate, as it has the right to do under the Constitution,
would take a so-called revenue bill passed by the House and attach
to it a quota on textile imports. The fact that the textile quota had
nothing to do with the revenue bill passed by the House did not
stop the Senate. The Senate is rather famous, or infamous if you
will, for attaching non-germane riders to a revenue bill returning
to the House. I might note that the Ways and Means and Finance
Committees have a rather extraordinary tradition concerning their
conference committee, which is the most critical part of the Ameri-
can legislative process and in which the House and Senate through
their agents work out the differences between the two versions of
[Vol. 6: 99
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a bill. These two committees permit representatives of the execu-
tive branch to attend conference committee meetings to provide es-
sentially technical advice. We certainly took advantage of the op-
portunity to tell the conferees how very bad and serious and dam-
aging we thought it would be if these textile quotas were enacted
into law. We did not so advise primarily because of President
Johnson's conviction on this matter. You may recall at one point
in a public speech he literally pounded the podium and said, "I
will never sign a bill with textile quotas in it." I would also note
the responsible behavior of the House Ways and Means Committee,
and particularly Chairman Mills, in deleting these riders.
There were many other aspects of this protectionism. The
Johnson administration tried to put forward a very modest trade bill
in 1968 which got nowhere. Among other things, it would have
discharged an obligation we assumed in the Kennedy Round, elim-
inating the American selling price system. This is an obligation
that the United States still has not discharged, very much to Amer-
ica's discredit.
The second development is the Nixon Administration. I sup-
pose in my kinder moods I would say that it has seriously com-
promised the liberal trade policy; in my harsher moods I would say
the current administration has been out-right protectionist. First and
foremost, the textile quota arrangements were finally negotiated,
after much effort, activity and unfortunate bitterness, with Japan
and other Far Eastern suppliers of textile products. There was a
renewal of the steel arrangements, which were first negotiated in
the Johnson administration and continued under the Nixon admin-
istration. There was what I regard - and as a private practitioner
I have seen this first hand - a protectionist administration of our
Anti-Dumping Act, in terms of how the Treasury Department and
the Tariff Commission acted upon it. Reference was made this
morning to the International Anti-Dumping Code, ' and I acknowl-
edge that the action Canada took in adhering to the Code and
changing its own legislation to permit implementation of the Code
was a major step forward. I am afraid that the United States has
moved backwards. If you look at the decisions in the United States
in this field, you have difficulty squaring those decisions with our
obligations under the International Anti-Dumping Code. Nor am
I happy with the administration of the countervailing duty stat-
5 Agreement on Implementation of Art. VI of the GATT, GATT, Doc. L 2812
(1967).
1973]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
ute.' I think the Michelin decision was clearly wrong, as a matter
of law and as a matter of policy."
Therefore, when one analyzes the post-Kennedy Round period,
I think one sees, on the one hand, a defensive effort on the part of
the Johnson administration to deal with imports which were clearly
increasing and on occasion causing problems and, on the other hand,
what in my view is the unenlightened, ill-advised, and dangerous
policy of the Nixon administration to cope with the substantial po-
litical problems that are created by increased imports. I shall not
begin to tell you how I think those problems should have been re-
solved, since that is not relevant to my discussion. The question is
whether the Auto Pact could have led to other arrangements. As I
see it, the cards were stacked against its extention into other areas,
perhaps for some of the reasons that Bob Hudec has mentioned,
but certainly for the reasons I have given, those being the Auto
Pact itself and the changes in U.S. trade policy since that time.
A major trade bill is now before Congress. There have been
forceful, even eloquent, expressions by this administration that it is
genuinely interested in the liberalization of trade and the reduc-
tion of tariff and non-tariff trade barriers. There is a commitment
on the part of the United States, the EEC, and Japan to commence
negotiations this September in a Nixon Round, if you will, and to
make a parallel effort in the monetary field. Looking ahead there-
to, I would ask if there is any reason to believe that, either as part
of this effort or as an ancillary aspect of it, another arrangement
like the Auto Pact will emerge between the United States and Can-
ada? I think the answer is quite clearly "no," and I will be brief
in giving my reasons for this conclusion: A preferential arrange-
ment would be very unlikely for several reasons. The United
States policy against preferences benefiting developed countries is
a major impediment, the very strong, and in my view correct, posi-
tion taken by the United States against so-called reverse preferences
when dealing with preferential arrangements between developing
countries and developed countries. A key example is the reverse
preferences granted by a number of African countries to products
from Western Europe. There would also be a difficult problem to
overcome if the United States were to try to move ahead in terms
of another preferential arrangement with Canada in another sec-
tor. I do not think the United States would get a sympathetic
6 The Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1303 (1970).
7 X-Radial Steel Belted Tires from Canada, T.D. 73-10, 38 Fed. Reg. 1015 (1973).
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audience from our GATT partners. It is all too true that the ef-
fectiveness of the GATT has been seriously diluted, in large part
because of American behavior in recent years. Nevertheless, I
think the GATT argument would be made, and it would have
some force. Further, I know of no authority in the trade bill that
the administration has proposed which would permit this prefer-
ential arrangement. I say that because, while there is authority in
the bill to eliminate tariffs, I read it in conjunction with the most-
favored-nation provision of that bill, so that any elimination of
tariffs would have to be on an MFN basis. Finally, if one con-
ceives of the possibility of a new preferential arrangement being
negotiated and then submitted by the executive branch to the Con-
gress for implementing legislation, as in the case of the Auto Pact
I see very serious problems. I think that it would raise anew many
of the fears and concerns on the issue of executive, right or wrong,
that existed in the Congress and Senate when the Auto Pact was
enacted.
Of course, there is the possibility of an MFN arrangement that
might emerge from the Nixon Round which would eliminate duties
on an MFN basis and benefit trade in a given sector between Can-
ada and the United States. I do not think the administration will
get the authority to eliminate duties. At best it will be very circum-
scribed. When I say circumscribed, I am not sure what I mean, but
my instinct is that the inevitable psychological difficulty that Con-
gress will have with the notion of an across-the-board authority to
eliminate duties will certainly play a role. Moreover, I think the
question concerning the kind of authority that the Congress should
delegate to the President under this bill will loom larger and
larger. In addition, even if one conceives of an MFN arrange-
ment, I am not sure the authority in the bill will be there; in any
key sector of trade I doubt very much that the European Economic
Community is really prepared to consider in any significant way a
duty-free arrangement. I sense a resistance to that.
I also feel that the non-tariff barrier problem will preoccupy
the negotiators, and indeed I think it should. In my view, tariffs
should be the minor aspect of the forthcoming negotiations. I do
not think anyone really know what will emerge from the non-
tariff barrier negotiations. I myself see essentially codes of conduct,
as were mentioned this morning. My hope is that there will be
no intensification of trade barriers coming out of the negotiation.
That may sound paradoxical but I really am concerned, for some of
19731
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the very reasons given this monrning, that the three economic super-
powers are on a mercantilist bent. It is not inconceivable that the
three might conclude arrangements that they would view in their
own best interests which would not involve a net reduction in trade
barriers.
In summary, looking to the future strictly in terms of United
States trade policy, American trade legislation, and what I see as the
results of the Nixon Round, I see very little chance for a successor
to the Auto Pact. I think it is an isolated phenomenon.
